Online research in philosophy

An explanation for the uncertain progress of formalist linguistics is sought in an examination of the concept of syntax. The idea of analyzing language formally was made possible by developments in 20th century logic. It has been pointed out by many that the analogy between natural language and a formal system may be imperfect, but the objection made here is that the very concept of syntax, when applied to any non-abstract system of communication, is flawed as it is commonly used. Syntax is properly defined with respect to an individual transformation rule that might be applied to some message. Collections of syntax rules, however, are inevitably due to categories imposed by an observer, and do not correspond to functional features found in non-abstract systems. As such, these categories should not be relied upon as aids to understanding any natural system.

This essay explores the place of coconstrual relations, such as antecedent-anaphor relations, in a theory of grammar informed by minimalist architecture. It has been argued that the logical space created by minimalist theorizing should favor an account of coconstrual derived from the tree-building operations of narrow syntax (Agree, feature theory, Merge and its subcase, Remerge), dispensing with rules or conditions that evaluate constructed trees. On such an account, it is argued, the explanatory power of narrow syntax is enhanced and the role of the interpretive component can be circumscribed. However, if coconstrual cannot be reduced to the derivational relations of narrow syntax, then we must be prepared to reevaluate the role of syntax-sensitive interpretive rules, balancing the need for such rules against any complication of narrow syntax mechanisms just to account for coconstrual. It will be argued that dependent identity relations, the form of coconstrual that is sensitive to syntactic configurations, must be interpreted from the output of narrow syntax and are not expressed within narrow syntax at all. This result unburdens narrow syntax of a class of relations that bring theoretical and empirical complications, while providing a more elegant account of coconstrual in a broader conception of the interpretive interface.

Some (Podro, Lopes) think that sometimes our experience of pictures is ‘inflected’. What we see in these pictures involves, somehow, an awareness of features of their design. I clarify the idea of inflection, arguing that the thought must be that what is seen in the picture is something with properties which themselves need characterising by reference to that picture’s design, conceived as such. I argue that there is at least one case of inflection, so understood. Proponents of inflection have claimed great significance for the phenomenon. But what might that significance be? Inter alia, I consider Lopes’s proposal that inflection solves a central problem in pictorial aesthetics, the ‘puzzle of mimesis’. I argue that the puzzle, and the proposed solution, both turn on aspects of Lopes’s conception of seeing-in. Other accounts of seeing-in can make no sense of either. I further argue that the phenomenon of inflection itself puts pressure on the sort of account Lopes offers. Thus it is hard to offer a view which both holds that inflection occurs and is able to make clear sense of why it matters.

Syntax, in its most general sense, is the study of the structure of sentences in natural language. In this course, we will approach syntax from the perspective of generative transformational grammar, as pioneered through the work of Noam Chomsky, and developed over the past four decades. Our goals are three-fold. First, to understand the nature of language as viewed from the structural perspective, and to understand the sort of insight about language this perspective affords. Second, to understand the nature and application of certain empirical methods to theoretical hypotheses within linguistics. And third, to understand certain general principles or laws of language which can be elucidated from the structural perspective by the empirical methods. The material in the course primarily will be drawn from English, but occasional reference will be made to other languages (although no prior knowledge is presupposed).

Abstract It is widely assumed that the meaning of at least some types of expressions involves more than their reference to objects, and hence that there may be co-referential expressions which differ in meaning. It is also widely assumed that ?syntax does not suffice for semantics?, i.e. that we cannot account for the fact that expressions have semantic properties in purely syntactical or computational terms. The main goal of the paper is to argue against a third related assumption, namely that what is responsible for a difference in meaning between co-referential expressions is the computational difference in the cognitive functioning of the expressions. ?Intentional aspects? of expressions?those features which their meanings involve in addition to reference?cannot be syntacticized, since they are individuated not in terms of any cognitive feature, but rather in terms of those properties of the referents through which the expressions refer to them, and cognitive features cannot determine such properties in exactly the same sense as they cannot determine reference.

Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the nature of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic? I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the nature of the pictorial. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory.

Along the way, Zero Syntax also examines issues of broad significance to current theoretical linguistic research in syntax and lexical semantics.Zero Syntax ...

John Searle once said: "The Chinese room shows what we knew all along: syntax by itself is not sufficient for semantics. (Does anyone actually deny this point, I mean straight out? Is anyone actually willing to say, straight out, that they think that syntax, in the sense of formal symbols, is really the same as semantic content, in the sense of meanings, thought contents, understanding, etc.?)." I say: "Yes". Stuart C. Shapiro has said: "Does that make any sense? Yes: Everything makes sense. The question is: What sense does it make?" This essay explores what sense it makes to say that syntax by itself is sufficient for semantics.

Our proposal is concerned with the relation between an aspect of phonology (linearization) and syntax.1 In the picture that we had in mind, the syntax is autonomous — "it does what it does" — but sometimes the result maps to an unusable phonological representation. In this sense, linearization acts logically as a filter on derivations. We know of no evidence that the syntax can predict which syntactic objects will be usable by the phonology, and we know of no clear evidence that the phonology communicates this information to the syntax. In this sense, our proposal fits squarely into the tradition that Svenonius characterizes as the "mainstream".2 We thus attempted to identify certain deviant configurations that are not plausibly excluded for syntax-internal reasons, but are filtered out in the linearization process.