David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 34 (2):137-147 (1967)
Four current accounts of theory reduction are presented, first informally and then formally: (1) an account of direct theory reduction that is based on the contributions of Nagel, Woodger, and Quine, (2) an indirect reduction paradigm due to Kemeny and Oppenheim, (3) an "isomorphic model" schema traceable to Suppes, and (4) a theory of reduction that is based on the work of Popper, Feyerabend, and Kuhn. Reference is made, in an attempt to choose between these schemas, to the explanation of physical optics by Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, and to the revisions of genetics necessitated by partial biochemical reductions of genetics. A more general reduction schema is proposed which: (1) yields as special cases the four reduction paradigms considered above, (2) seems to be in better accord with both the canons of logic and actual scientific practice, and (3) clarifies the problems of meaning variance and ontological reduction
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
John Bickle (2006). Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating the Reductionism Implicit in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Synthese 151 (3):411-434.
Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, Roman Frigg & Stephan Hartmann (2010). Who's Afraid of Nagelian Reduction? Erkenntnis 73 (3):393-412.
William P. Bechtel (1994). Levels of Description and Explanation in Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 4 (1):1-25.
Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1992). Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived. Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.
Colin Klein (2009). Reduction Without Reductionism: A Defence of Nagel on Connectability. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):39 - 53.
Similar books and articles
Thomas Nickles (2005). Problem Reduction: Some Thoughts. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1):107-133.
A. Lindenmayer & N. Simon (1980). The Formal Structure of Genetics and the Reduction Problem. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:160 - 170.
Sahotra Sarkar (1992). Models of Reduction and Categories of Reductionism. Synthese 91 (3):167-94.
Kenneth F. Schaffner (1993). Theory Structure, Reduction, and Disciplinary Integration in Biology. Biology and Philosophy 8 (3):319-347.
Raphael van Riel (2011). Nagelian Reduction Beyond the Nagel Model. Philosophy of Science 78 (3):353-375.
Raphael van Riel (2010). Identity-Based Reduction and Reductive Explanation. Philosophia Naturalis 47 (1-2):183-219.
Michael Esfeld, Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom (2012). Marrying the Merits of Nagelian Reduction and Functional Reduction. Acta Analytica 27 (3):217-230.
Ronald P. Endicott (2007). Reinforcing the Three ‘R's: Reduction, Reception, and Replacement. In M. Schouten & H. Looren de Jong (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience, and Reduction. Blackwell
Steven Orla Kimbrough (1979). On the Reduction of Genetics to Molecular Biology. Philosophy of Science 46 (3):389-406.
David L. Hull (1981). Reduction and Genetics. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 6 (2):125-144.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads167 ( #14,633 of 1,781,458 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #64,123 of 1,781,458 )
How can I increase my downloads?