David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 43 (1):1-30 (2009)
What does it take to count as competent with the meaning of a thin evaluative predicate like 'is the right thing to do'? According to minimalists like Allan Gibbard and Ralph Wedgwood, competent speakers must simply use the predicate to express their own motivational states. According to analytic descriptivists like Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit and Christopher Peacocke, competent speakers must grasp a particular criterion for identifying the property picked out by the term. Both approaches face serious difficulties. We suggest that these difficulties derive from a shared background assumption that competence conditions must be explained in terms of a determinate conceptual role. We propose a new way of characterizing competence with evaluative terms: what's required for competence is participation in a shared epistemic practice with a term. Our approach, we argue, better explains the nature of evaluative inquiry and the extent of disagreement about evaluative questions.
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References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (2003). Thinking How to Live. Harvard University Press.
Timothy Williamson (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Pub..
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Derek Baker (2016). Intuitions About Disagreement Do Not Support the Normativity of Meaning. Dialectica 70 (1):65-84.
Laura Schroeter (2008). Why Be an Anti-Individualist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):105-141.
Jonathan McKeown‐Green, Glen Pettigrove & Aness Webster (2015). Conjuring Ethics From Words. Noûs 49 (1):71-93.
Bart Streumer (2011). Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties? Philosophical Studies 154 (3):325 - 348.
Laura Schroeter (2012). Bootstrapping Our Way to Samesaying. Synthese 189 (1):177-197.
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