David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 67 (295):186–194 (2007)
Most contemporary philosophers of action agree on the following claims. Firstly, the possibility of deviant or wayward causal chains poses a serious problem for the standard-causal theory of action. Secondly, we can distinguish between different kinds of deviant causal chains in the theory of action. In particular, we can distinguish between cases of basic and cases of consequential deviance. Thirdly, the problem of consequential deviance admits of a fairly straightforward solution, whereas the possibility of basic deviance constitutes a separate and difficult problem that requires its own solution. I will argue that the problem of basic deviance is no more troublesome than the problem of consequential deviance, as a solution to the former is implicit in the standard solution to the latter.
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Taking Something as a Reason for Action. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
Joshua Shepherd (2014). The Contours of Control. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):395-411.
Wayne Wu (2015). Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):n/a-n/a.
Neil McDonnell (2015). The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):162-170.
David Horst (2015). Actions and Accidents. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):300-325.
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