Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Issues 2:29-38 (1992)
|Abstract||Suppose we think in a language of thought. Then Paul Boghossian' is prepared to argue, first, that there may be ambiguous Mentalese expression types that have unambiguous tokens, and, second, that the way in which this is possible allows for otherwise valid theoretical or practical reasoning to be rendered invalid owing to equivocation of a sort that may be undetectable to the reasoner. Paul sees this as a possible basis from which to launch an argument for what some might call "narrow content", and this is a question I'll take up later|
|Keywords||Externalism Inference Knowledge Language Logic Boghossian, P|
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