Chance and actuality

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):105-129 (2011)
The relation between chance and actuality gives rise to a puzzle. On the one hand, it may be a chancy matter what will actually happen. On the other hand, the standard semantics for ‘actually’ implies that sentences beginning with ‘actually’ are never contingent. To elucidate the puzzle, I defend a kind of objective semantic indeterminacy: in a chancy world, it may be a chancy matter which proposition is expressed by sentences containing ‘actually’. I bring this thesis to bear on certain counter-examples, proposed by Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio, to Lewis' ‘principal principle’
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