Causes as probability raisers of processes

Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):75-92 (2001)
Causation, according to David Hume, is one of the three fundamental conceptual relations (along with resemblance and contiguity), and is the foundation of all reasoning concerning matters of fact. Causation, according to various contemporary philosophers, is required for the analysis of metaphysical concepts such as persistence, scientific concepts such as explanation and disposition, epistemic concepts such as perception and warrant, ethical concepts such as action and responsibility, legal concepts such as homicide and negligence, mental concepts such as functional role and conceptual content, and linguistic concepts such as reference, to name just a salient few. Yet the nature of the causal relation itself remains mysterious.
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DOI jphil200198231
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Andrew Naylor (2012). Belief From the Past. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):598-620.
Alexander Rueger (2006). Connection and Influence: A Process Theory of Causation. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (1):77 - 97.

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