Contrastive causation

Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358 (2005)
Abstract
Causation is widely assumed to be a binary relation: c causes e. I will argue that causation is a quaternary, contrastive relation: c rather than C* causes e rather than E*, where C* and E* are nonempty sets of contrast events. Or at least, I will argue that treating causation as contrastive helps resolve some paradoxes.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,986
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Alex Broadbent (2012). Causes of Causes. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):457-476.
Jonathan Schaffer (2012). Disconnection and Responsibility. Legal Theory 18 (Special Issue 04):399-435.

View all 34 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

135 ( #6,223 of 1,100,994 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

17 ( #9,580 of 1,100,994 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.