Contrastive causation

Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358 (2005)
Causation is widely assumed to be a binary relation: c causes e. I will argue that causation is a quaternary, contrastive relation: c rather than C* causes e rather than E*, where C* and E* are nonempty sets of contrast events. Or at least, I will argue that treating causation as contrastive helps resolve some paradoxes.
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-114-3-327
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