Closure, contrast, and answer

Philosophical Studies 133 (2):233–255 (2007)
Abstract
How should the contrastivist formulate closure? That is, given that knowledge is a ternary contrastive state Kspq (s knows that p rather than q), how does this state extend under entailment? In what follows, I will identify adequacy conditions for closure, criticize the extant invariantist and contextualist closure schemas, and provide a contrastive schema based on the idea of extending answers. I will conclude that only the contrastivist can adequately formulate closure.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
    Fred Dretske (1981). The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 40 (3):363--378.

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