Counterfactuals, causal independence and conceptual circularity

Analysis 64 (4):299–308 (2004)
David Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals remains the standard view. Yet counter-examples have emerged, which suggest a need to invoke causal independence, and thus threaten conceptual circularity. I will review some of these counter-examples (§§1–2), illustrate how causal independence proves useful (§3), and suggest that any resulting circularity is unproblematic (§4).
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DOI 10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00501.x
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Rachael Briggs (2012). Interventionist Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
Alexander Reutlinger (2012). Getting Rid of Interventions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (4):787-795.
Alex Broadbent (2012). Causes of Causes. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):457-476.
Boris Kment (2006). Counterfactuals and the Analysis of Necessity. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):237–302.

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