Contrastive causation in the law

Legal Theory 16 (4):259-297 (2010)
What conception of causation is at work in the law? I argue that the law implicitly relies on a contrastive conception. In a liability case where the defendant's breach of duty must be shown to have caused the plaintiff's damages, it is not enough to consider what would have happened if the cause had not occurredthe law requires us to look to a specific replacement for the effect, which in this case is the hypothetical outcome in which the plaintiff came off better. In place of I suggest the more explicit An explicitly contrastive approach can thus potentially help the lawyer phrase her causal question in a more explicit way, while shedding light on our conception of causation.
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DOI 10.1017/S1352325210000224
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour & Richard Scheines (1996). Causation, Prediction, and Search. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):113-123.
Jonathan Schaffer (2005). Contrastive Causation. Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.

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Citations of this work BETA
David Hommen (2014). Moore and Schaffer on the Ontology of Omissions. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):71-89.
Julian Reiss (2013). Contextualising Causation Part I. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1066-1075.

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