Contrastive Knowledge: Reply to Baumann

In Stefan Tolksdorf (ed.), The Concept of Knowledge. Walter de Gruyter (forthcoming)
Abstract
Baumann (2008a) raises three main concerns for epistemic contrastivism. These lead him to a more complicated re-conception of knowledge, involving varying numbers of argument places for varying sorts of arguments. I will argue that these complications are unneeded. The more elegant and uniform contrastive treatment can resolve all of Baumann’s concerns, in a straightforward way.
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