Hume Studies (forthcoming)
|Abstract||Hume famously asserts that moral assessments refer to character; it is character of which we morally approve and disapprove. I am interested in what Hume means by "character." Is it true that moral assessments refer to character, and should Hume think this given his other commitments in moral philosophy and moral psychology? In what follows, I discuss two prominent themes—one from his moral philosophy, namely, moral responsibility; and one from his moral psychology, namely, the comparison of moral feelings with feelings of love—to see what light these themes can shed on Hume's broader views about moral assessment. I will argue that at least according to a traditional understanding of the term, character could not ..|
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