Causality, referring, and proper names

Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):225 - 233 (1978)
Abstract
I argue that (a) the causal theory of proper names and (b) Kripke's chain of references thesis are logically independent of each other, and that the case for (a) is very weak. I observe that rejecting (a) we lose one powerful reason for treating proper names as rigid designators. I then consider reasons for subscribing to (b), and I argue that (b) is compatible with either a rigid or a non-rigid (descriptive) semantic treatment of proper names.
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Devitt (1974). Singular Terms. Journal of Philosophy 71 (7):183-205.
Richard Grandy (1973). Reference, Meaning, and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):439-452.
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