Can the self be a brain?

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (2): 235 - 246 (2015)
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Abstract

Philosophical materialists suggest that a person can be identified with their brain. My paper is a critical investigation of this provocative thesis and an analysis of some of the prominent arguments to support this view. My overall argument is that there is more to this issue than some philosophers appear to acknowledge.

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10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n2p235

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Alan Schwerin
Rice University (PhD)

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

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