David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy Compass 1 (6):631–639 (2006)
Desires move us to action, give us urges, incline us to joy at their satisfaction, and incline us to sorrow at their frustration. Naturalistic work on desire has focused on distinguishing which of these phenomena are part of the nature of desire, and which are merely normal consequences of desiring. Three main answers have been proposed. The first holds that the central necessary fact about desires is that they lead to action. The second makes pleasure the essence of desire. And the third holds that the central necessary fact about desires is that they open us to reward-based learning.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Attila Tanyi (2013). Pure Cognitivism and Beyond. Acta Analytica:1-18.
Similar books and articles
Chase Wrenn (2010). A Puzzle About Desire. Erkenntnis 73 (2):185-209.
G. F. Schueler (1995). Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action. MIT Press.
Christopher G. Framarin (2006). The Desire You Are Required to Get Rid Of: A Functionalist Analysis of Desire in the Bhagavadgita. Philosophy East and West 56 (4):604-+.
Chris Heathwood (2005). The Problem of Defective Desires. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):487 – 504.
Steven Arkonovich (2012). Conflicts of Desire. Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (1):51-63.
David Gordon (1988). Projectivist Utilitarianism and the Satisfaction of Desire. Erkenntnis 29 (3):437 - 443.
Richard Swinburne (1985). Desire. Philosophy 60 (234):429 - 445.
David Wall (2009). Are There Passive Desires? Dialectica 63 (2):133-155.
Chris Heathwood (2011). Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Timothy Schroeder (2004). Three Faces of Desire. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads49 ( #27,977 of 1,089,153 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #30,953 of 1,089,153 )
How can I increase my downloads?