David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In CPNSS Discussion Paper. LSE (2002)
This paper challenges the first Gettier counterexample to the tripartite account of knowledge. Noting that 'the man who will get the job' is a description and invoking Donnellan's distinction between their 'referential' and 'attributive' uses, I argue that Smith does not actually believe that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's ignorance about who will get the job shows that the belief cannot be understood referentially, his ignorance of the coins in his pocket shows that it cannot be understood attributively. An explanation for why Smith appeared to have justified true belief is given by distinguishing between 'belief' and 'belief in truth'. Smith believes the sentence 'the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket' to be true (he mistakenly believes that Jones will get the job, of whom he knows that he has ten coins in his pocket) (hence his 'belief'), the sentence is true (hence 'truth'), and he has sufficient reason to assent to it (hence his 'justification'). But he does not believe the proposition expressed. Hence he does not know it either.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John Turri (2012). Is Knowledge Justified True Belief? Synthese 184 (3):247-259.
Richard Foley, A Trial Separation Between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief.
Tomasz A. Puczyłowski (2007). Problem Gettiera a problem uzasadnienia. Filozofia Nauki 2.
Stefano Predelli (2003). Russellian Description and Smith's Suicide. Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):125-141.
Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do? Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
Igor Douven (2005). A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):207-228.
Stephen Hetherington, Gettier Problems. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
B. J. C. Madison (2011). Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.
Kent Bach (2004). Descriptions: Points of Reference. In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond. Clarendon Press 189-229.
Filip Kawczyński (2007). O atrybutywnych i referencyjnych użyciach deskrypcji określonych. Filozofia Nauki 4.
L. Floridi (2004). On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem. Synthese 142 (1):61 - 79.
J. Biro (2013). Showing the Time. Analysis 73 (1):57-62.
Keith S. Donnellan (1966). Reference and Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman (2012). The Folk Conception of Knowledge. Cognition 124 (3):272-283.
Added to index2012-02-09
Total downloads67 ( #63,909 of 1,907,150 )
Recent downloads (6 months)21 ( #31,814 of 1,907,150 )
How can I increase my downloads?