David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophers' Imprint 3 (1):1-14 (2003)
Donald Davidson's theory of mind is widely regarded as a normative theory. This is a something of a confusion. Once a distinction has been made between the categorisation scheme of a norm and the norm's force-maker, it becomes clear that a Davidsonian theory of mind is not a normative theory after all. Making clear the distinction, applying it to Davidson's theory of mind, and showing its significance are the main purposes of this paper. In the concluding paragraphs, a sketch is given of how a truly normative Davidsonian theory of mind might be formulated.
|Keywords||Metaphysics Mind Normative Davidson, D|
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Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2011). Against Essential Mental Normativity Again. Dialogue 50 (02):333-346.
Uriah Kriegel (2010). Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
Timothy Schroeder (2010). Practical Rationality is a Problem in the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):394-409.
Hilla Jacobson (2010). Normativity Without Reflectivity: On the Beliefs and Desires of Non-Reflective Creatures. Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):75-93.
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