David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind and Language 20 (4):423-447 (2005)
In this essay I defend a theory of psychological explanation that is based on the joint commitment to direct reference and computationalism. I offer a new solution to the problem of Frege Cases. Frege Cases involve agents who are unaware that certain expressions corefer (e.g. that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' corefer), where such knowledge is relevant to the success of their behavior, leading to cases in which the agents fail to behave as the intentional laws predict. It is generally agreed that Frege Cases are a major problem, if not the major problem, that this sort of theory faces. In this essay, I hope to show that the theory can surmount the Frege Cases.
|Keywords||Computation Explanation Psychology Reference Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
David Kaplan (1989). Demonstratives. In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press 481-563.
Nathan U. Salmon (1986). Frege's Puzzle. Ridgeview.
Citations of this work BETA
Andrea Onofri (2016). Two Constraints on a Theory of Concepts. Dialectica 70 (1):3-27.
Bradley Rives (2009). Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):211 - 238.
Susan Schneider (2009). LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room. Synthese 170 (2):235 - 250.
Susan Schneider (2009). The Nature of Symbols in the Language of Thought. Mind and Language 24 (5):523-553.
Kirk Ludwig & Susan Schneider (2008). Fodor's Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind. Mind and Language 23 (1):123–143.
Similar books and articles
Joan Bryans (1992). Substitution and the Explanation of Action. Erkenntnis 37 (3):365 - 376.
Øystein Linnebo (2004). Frege's Proof of Referentiality. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 45 (2):73-98.
Saul A. Kripke (2008). Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes. Theoria 74 (3):181-218.
Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Direct Reference in Thought and Speech. Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 26 (1):49-76.
Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (2001). Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.
Øystein Linnebo (2009). Frege's Context Principle and Reference to Natural Numbers. In Sten Lindström (ed.), Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism: What Has Become of Them. Springer
Wolfgang Carl (1994). Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Its Origins and Scope. Cambridge University Press.
Jerome C. Wakefield (2002). Broad Versus Narrow Content in the Explanation of Action: Fodor on Frege Cases. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads82 ( #55,447 of 1,938,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #45,837 of 1,938,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?