Does the Phenomenality of Perceptual Experience Present an Obstacle to Phenomenal Externalism?

Philosophical Papers 39 (1):93-110 (2009)
Abstract
: Although Externalism is widely accepted as a thesis about belief, as a thesis about experience it is both controversial and unpopular. One potential explanation of this difference involves the phenomenality of perceptual experience—perhaps there is something about how perceptual experiences seem that straightforwardly speaks against Externalist accounts of their individuation conditions. In this paper, I investigate this idea by exploring the role that the phenomenality of color experience plays in a prominent argument against Phenomenal Externalism: Ned Block’s Inverted Earth Argument. In the course of carrying out this investigation, I will show that challenging Phenomenal Externalism on phenomenological grounds is not as straightforward a task as it is commonly assumed to be.
Keywords Phenomenal Externalism  Externalism  Representationalism
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1990). Inverted Earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
Ned Block (1998). Is Experiencing Just Representing? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):663-670.
Ned Block (1998). Review: Is Experiencing Just Representing? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):663 - 670.
Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.

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