Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005)
events all seem to have something in common, metaphysically speaking, and some philosophers have inquired into what this common nature is. The main aim of a theory of events is to propose and defend an identity condition on events; that is, a condition under which two events are identical. For example, if Brutus kills Caesar by stabbing him, are there two events, the stabbing and the killing, or only one event? Each of the leading theories of events is surveyed in this article. According to Jaegwon Kim, events are basically property instantiations. In contrast, Donald Davidson attempts to individuate events by their causes and effects. However, Davidson eventually rejects this view and, together with W.V.O. Quine, individuates events with respect to their location in spacetime. According to David Lewis, an event is a property of a spatiotemporal region.
Keywords Events  Kim  Davidson  Lewis
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Susan Schneider (2012). Non-Reductive Physicalism Cannot Appeal to Token Identity1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):719-728.

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