Evolution and Normative Scepticism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):471-488 (2010)
It is increasingly common to suggest that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative realism leads inevitably to a general scepticism about our ability to reliably form normative beliefs. In what follows, I argue that this is not the case. In particular, I consider several possible arguments from evolutionary theory and normative realism to normative scepticism and explain where they go wrong. I then offer a more general diagnosis of the tendency to accept such arguments and why this tendency should be resisted
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DOI 10.1080/00048400903114219
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1971). Immodest Inductive Methods. Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63.

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Marc Artiga (2015). Rescuing Tracking Theories of Morality. Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3357-3374.

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