Experience and self-consciousness

Philosophical Studies 144 (1):95 - 105 (2009)
Abstract
Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers “yes”. I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer—a well-known regress argument, what I call the “interview argument,” and a phenomenological argument. Drawing on Sartre, I introduce a phenomenological contrast between plain experience and self-conscious experience. The contrast challenges the thesis that conscious experience entails self-consciousness.
Keywords Dan Zahavi  Phenomenology  Conscious experience  Self-consciousness  First-person thought  Post-Fichtean  Sartre  Shoemaker  Refrigerator light fallacy  Existential subjectivity
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    Sydney Shoemaker (1968). Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
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