Experience and self-consciousness
Philosophical Studies 144 (1):95 - 105 (2009)
| Abstract | Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers “yes”. I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer—a well-known regress argument, what I call the “interview argument,” and a phenomenological argument. Drawing on Sartre, I introduce a phenomenological contrast between plain experience and self-conscious experience. The contrast challenges the thesis that conscious experience entails self-consciousness. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesPeter Bieri (1995). Why is Consciousness Puzzling? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
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