Epistemic comparativism: a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions
Philosophical Studies:1-53 (forthcoming)
| Abstract | Knowledge ascriptions seem context sensitive. Yet it is widely thought that epistemic contextualism does not have a plausible semantic implementation. We aim to overcome this concern by articulating and defending an explicit contextualist semantics for ‘know,’ which integrates a fairly orthodox contextualist conception of knowledge as the elimination of the relevant alternatives, with a fairly orthodox “Amherst” semantics for A-quantification over a contextually variable domain of situations. Whatever problems epistemic contextualism might face, lack of an orthodox semantic implementation is not among them | |||||||||
| Keywords | Epistemic contextualism Knowledge Semantics Context | |||||||||
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