Epistemic comparativism: a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions

Philosophical Studies (2):1-53 (2013)
Abstract
Knowledge ascriptions seem context sensitive. Yet it is widely thought that epistemic contextualism does not have a plausible semantic implementation. We aim to overcome this concern by articulating and defending an explicit contextualist semantics for ‘know,’ which integrates a fairly orthodox contextualist conception of knowledge as the elimination of the relevant alternatives, with a fairly orthodox “Amherst” semantics for A-quantification over a contextually variable domain of situations. Whatever problems epistemic contextualism might face, lack of an orthodox semantic implementation is not among them
Keywords Epistemic contextualism  Knowledge  Semantics  Context
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References found in this work BETA
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Kent Bach (1994). Conversational Impliciture. Mind and Language 9 (2):124-162.

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