Epistemic logic, skepticism, and non-normal modal logic

Philosophical Studies 40 (1):47 - 67 (1981)
Abstract
An epistemic logic is built up on the basis of an analysis of two skeptical arguments. the method used is to first construct an inference relation appropriate to epistemic contexts and introduce "a knows that..." as an operator giving rise to sentences closed with respect to this new concept of inference. soundness and completeness proofs are provided using auxiliary three-valued valuations
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References found in this work BETA
Jaakko Hintikka (1975). Impossible Possible Worlds Vindicated. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (4):475 - 484.
Jaakko Hintikka (1962). Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca, N.Y.,Cornell University Press.
P. K. Schotch & R. E. Jennings (1980). Inference and Necessity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (3):327-340.

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