Synthese 174 (3) (2010)
|Abstract||Recently, Yalcin (Epistemic modals. Mind, 116 , 983–1026, 2007) put forward a novel account of epistemic modals. It is based on the observation that sentences of the form ‘ & Might ’ do not embed under ‘suppose’ and ‘if’. Yalcin concludes that such sentences must be contradictory and develops a notion of informational consequence which validates this idea. I will show that informational consequence is inadequate as an account of the logic of epistemic modals: it cannot deal with reasoning from uncertain premises. Finally, I offer an alternative way of explaining the relevant linguistic data.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Malte Willer (forthcoming). Realizing What Might Be. Philosophical Studies.
Andy Egan, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson (2005). Epistemic Modals in Context. In G. Preyer & G. Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Kai von Fintel (2003). Epistemic Containment. Linguistic Inquiry 34:173-98.
Moritz Schulz (2010). Wondering What Might Be. Philosophical Studies 149 (3).
Seth Yalcin (2009). More on Epistemic Modals. Mind 118 (471):785-793.
Joshua D. Crabill (2013). Suppose Yalcin is Wrong About Epistemic Modals. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):625-635.
Benjamin Schnieder (2010). Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):601-615.
Added to index2009-02-16
Total downloads49 ( #21,760 of 549,088 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,088 )
How can I increase my downloads?