Focused Correlation, Confirmation, and the Jigsaw Puzzle of Variable Evidence

Philosophy of Science 78 (3):376-92 (2011)
Abstract
Focused correlation compares the degree of association within an evidence set to the degree of association in that evidence set given that some hypothesis is true. A difference between the confirmation lent to a hypothesis by one evidence set and the confirmation lent to that hypothesis by another evidence set is robustly tracked by a difference in focused correlations of those evidence sets on that hypothesis, provided that all the individual pieces of evidence are equally, positively relevant to that hypothesis. However, that result depends on a very strong equal relevance condition on individual pieces of evidence. In this essay, we prove tracking results for focused correlation analogous to Wheeler and Scheines’s results but for cases involving unequal relevance. Our result is robust as well, and we retain conditions for bidirectional tracking between incremental confirmation measures and focused correlation.
Keywords focused correlation  coherence measures  truth conduciveness  incremental confirmation
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Gregory Wheeler (2009). Focused Correlation and Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):79-100.
Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines (2011). Causation, Association and Confirmation. In Stephan Hartmann, Marcel Weber, Wenceslao Gonzalez, Dennis Dieks & Thomas Uebe (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation: New Trends and Old Ones Reconsidered. Springer. 37--51.
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Franz Huber (2005). What Is the Point of Confirmation? Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1146-1159.
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