David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):365-384 (2012)
Benjamin Libet's empirical challenge to free will has received a great deal of attention and criticism. A standard line of response has emerged that many take to be decisive against Libet's challenge. In the first part of this paper, I will argue that this standard response fails to put the challenge to rest. It fails, in particular, to address a recent follow-up experiment that raises a similar worry about free will (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). In the second part, however, I will argue that we can altogether avoid Libet-style challenges if we adopt a traditional compatibilist account of free will. In the final section, I will briefly explain why there is good and independent reason to think about free will in this way
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References found in this work BETA
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Benjamin W. Libet (1985). Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.
Alfred R. Mele (2009). Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Markus E. Schlosser (2014). The Neuroscientific Study of Free Will: A Diagnosis of the Controversy. Synthese 191 (2):245-262.
Markus E. Schlosser (2013). Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.
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