Human Morality

Oxford University Press (1992)
Some people believe that the demands of morality coincide with the requirements of an enlightened self-interest. Others believe that morality is diametrically opposed to considerations of self-interest. This book argues that there is another position, intermediate between these extremes, which makes better sense of the totality of our moral thought and practice. Scheffler elaborates this position via an examination of morality's content, scope, authority, and deliberative role. Although conflicts between morality and self-interest do arise, according to this position, nevertheless morality is fundamentally a reasonable and humane phenomenon. Moreover, the psychological bases of effective moral motivation have sources deep within the self, and morally motivated individuals try to shape their own interests so as to avoid conflict with morality. Since human practices and institutions help to determine the prevalence of these motives, and since in this and other ways they influence the degree to which conflicts between morality and self-interest actually occur, the extent of such conflict is not fixed or immutable, and is in part a social and political issue.
Keywords Ethics
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Call number BJ1012.S34 1992
ISBN(s) 0195074483   0195085647   9780195085648  
DOI 10.2307/2219906
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Béatrice Longuenesse (2012). Kant's 'I' in 'I Ought To' and Freud's Superego. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):19-39.
Adam Kadlac (2015). Does It Matter Whether We Do Wrong? Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2279-2298.

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