Hume Studies 33 (1):41-66 (2007)
|Abstract||In section 12 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Hume presents several skeptical arguments, including “popular” and “philosophical”objections to inductive reasoning. I point out a puzzling aspect of Hume’s treatment of these two kinds of objection, and I suggest a way to deal with the puzzle. I then examine the roles of both kinds of objection in leading to “mitigated” skepticism. In particular, Hume claims that the philosophical objection can lead to limiting investigation to matters of common life; but several philosophers have noted that this objection, far from leading to this result, seems to be inconsistent with it. I examine attempts to establish consistency, and I suggest a way to understand how the philosophical objection, along with the popular objections, can indeed provide reasons for mitigated skepticism|
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