David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71 (2008)
What is it to have a reason? According to one common idea, the "Factoring Account", you have a reason to do A when there is a reason for you to do A which you have--which is somehow in your possession or grasp. In this paper, I argue that this common idea is false. But though my arguments are based on the practical case, the implications of this are likely to be greatest in epistemology: for the pitfalls we fall into when trying to defend the Factoring Account reflect very well the major developments in empiricist epistemology during the 20th century. I conjecture that this is because epistemologists have been--wrongly--wedded to the Factoring Account about evidence, which I conjecture is a certain kind of reason to believe.
|Keywords||Reasons Subjective Objective Bernard Williams Epistemology Evidence Basing|
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (2000). Practical Reality. Oxford University Press.
Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.
Bernard Williams (1979). Internal and External Reasons. In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press 101-113.
Citations of this work BETA
Benjamin Kiesewetter (forthcoming). You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Quarterly.
Jonathan Way (2015). Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
Juan Comesana & Matthew McGrath (2016). Perceptual Reasons. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):991-1006.
Stephen Finlay (2010). What Ought Probably Means, and Why You Can't Detach It. Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.
Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.
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