David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71 (2008)
What is it to have a reason? According to one common idea, the "Factoring Account", you have a reason to do A when there is a reason for you to do A which you have--which is somehow in your possession or grasp. In this paper, I argue that this common idea is false. But though my arguments are based on the practical case, the implications of this are likely to be greatest in epistemology: for the pitfalls we fall into when trying to defend the Factoring Account reflect very well the major developments in empiricist epistemology during the 20th century. I conjecture that this is because epistemologists have been--wrongly--wedded to the Factoring Account about evidence, which I conjecture is a certain kind of reason to believe.
|Keywords||Reasons Subjective Objective Bernard Williams Epistemology Evidence Basing|
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (2000). Practical Reality. Oxford University Press.
Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
Bernard Williams (1979). Internal and External Reasons. In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press 101-113.
D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Kurt Sylvan (2015). What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be. Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.
Samuel Taylor (2015). Is Justification Easy or Impossible? Getting Acquainted with a Middle Road. Synthese 192 (9):2987-3009.
Benjamin Kiesewetter (forthcoming). You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Quarterly.
Eric Vogelstein (2012). Subjective Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.
Jonathan Way (2015). Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
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