Having reasons

Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71 (2008)
What is it to have a reason? According to one common idea, the "Factoring Account", you have a reason to do A when there is a reason for you to do A which you have--which is somehow in your possession or grasp. In this paper, I argue that this common idea is false. But though my arguments are based on the practical case, the implications of this are likely to be greatest in epistemology: for the pitfalls we fall into when trying to defend the Factoring Account reflect very well the major developments in empiricist epistemology during the 20th century. I conjecture that this is because epistemologists have been--wrongly--wedded to the Factoring Account about evidence, which I conjecture is a certain kind of reason to believe
Keywords Reasons  Subjective  Objective  Bernard Williams  Epistemology  Evidence  Basing
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DOI 10.2307/40208891
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Bernard Williams (1979). Internal and External Reasons. In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press 101-113.
D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.

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