David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):27-46 (2001)
This paper makes a comparison between naturalist and non-naturalist theories of consciousness with respect to their explanatory merits. It focuses on David Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory, arguing that the motives for higher-order theories are based on a confusion of three distinct meanings of the term 'intrinsic'. The explanatory power of HOT theories is compared with that of an alternative nonrepresentational theory, offered as an example of a naturalistic account. The latter is found overall to have more virtues and less shortcomings that the higher-order theory
|Keywords||Consciousness Metaphysics Naturalism Rosenthal, D|
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Toby M. Pearce (2003). Review. [REVIEW] Ratio 16 (2):198–203.
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