Higher-order thought and naturalist accounts of consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):27-46 (2001)
Abstract
This paper makes a comparison between naturalist and non-naturalist theories of consciousness with respect to their explanatory merits. It focuses on David Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory, arguing that the motives for higher-order theories are based on a confusion of three distinct meanings of the term 'intrinsic'. The explanatory power of HOT theories is compared with that of an alternative nonrepresentational theory, offered as an example of a naturalistic account. The latter is found overall to have more virtues and less shortcomings that the higher-order theory
Keywords Consciousness  Metaphysics  Naturalism  Rosenthal, D
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