David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan. 282--298 (2010)
In this paper I explore why one might hope to, and how to begin to, develop an expressivist account of truth – that is, a semantics for ‘true’ and ‘false’ within an expressivist framework. I do so for a few reasons: because certain features of deflationism seem to me to require some sort of nondescriptivist semantics, because of all nondescriptivist semantic frameworks which are capable of yielding definite predictions rather than consisting merely of hand-waving, expressivism is that with which I am most familiar, and because I believe that certain problems about truth and particularly about paradox seem to me to look different, when seen through the lens of an expressivist theory. I don’t mean to defend such a theory in this paper, and indeed I have cast doubts on the ultimate prospects of the framework I will be employing here elsewhere.1 But I do think that seeing what an expressivist theory of truth would look like helps to shed light on both expressivism and on truth.
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Citations of this work BETA
Mark Schroeder (2013). Two Roles for Propositions: Cause for Divorce? Noûs 47 (3):409-430.
Kevin Scharp & Stewart Shapiro (2012). On Richard's When Truth Gives Out. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 160 (3):455-463.
Dorit Bar-On & James Sias (2013). Varieties of Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):699-713.
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