David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344 (2011)
Particularists in ethics emphasize that the normative is holistic, and invite us to infer with them that it therefore defies generalization. This has been supposed to present an obstacle to traditional moral theorizing, to have striking implications for moral epistemology and moral deliberation, and to rule out reductive theories of the normative, making it a bold and important thesis across the areas of normative theory, moral epistemology, moral psychology, and normative metaphysics. Though particularists emphasize the importance of the holism of the normative, however, it is not something that they have been able to explain. In this paper I’ll show how to use a small number of simple and, I’ll argue, independently compelling assumptions in order to both predict and explain the holistic features of the normative with respect to the non-normative. The basic idea of the paper is simple. It is that normative claims are holistic because they are general, rather than because they defy generalization.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Roger Crisp (2000). Particularizing Particularism. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press. 23--47.
Ralph Cudworth (1996/1976). A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality. Cambridge University Press.
Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2000). The Moralistic Fallacy: On the "Appropriateness" of Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
Jonathan Dancy (2004). Ethics Without Principles. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (2009). Moral Particularism. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
Citations of this work BETA
Attila Tanyi (2013). Silencing Desires? Philosophia 41 (3):887-903.
Mark Schroeder (2009). Jonathan Dancy. Ethics Without Principles (Oxford University Press, 2004)Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge. Principled Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2006). [REVIEW] Noûs 43 (3):568-580.
Similar books and articles
Peter Schulte (2012). The Difference Between Moral and Rational “Oughts”: An Expressivist Account. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):159-174.
Selim Berker (2007). Particular Reasons. Ethics 118 (1):109-139.
Luke Robinson (2006). Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism. Mind 115 (458):331-360.
Katinka Quintelier & Daniel Fessler (2012). Varying Versions of Moral Relativism: The Philosophy and Psychology of Normative Relativism. Biology and Philosophy 27 (1):95-113.
Adrian Miroiu (1996). Global Warming and Moral Theorizing. Theoria 11 (3):61-81.
Michael Pendlebury (2010). How to Be a Normative Expressivist. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):182-207.
A. John Simmons (1996). Associative Political Obligations. Ethics 106 (2):247-273.
Michael Ridge (2005). What Does Holism Have to Do with Moral Particularism? Ratio 18 (1):93-103.
Michael Philips (1985). Normative Contexts and Moral Decision. Journal of Business Ethics 4 (4):233 - 237.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads65 ( #22,491 of 1,101,094 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #22,982 of 1,101,094 )
How can I increase my downloads?