Holism, Weight, and Undercutting

Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344 (2011)
Abstract
Particularists in ethics emphasize that the normative is holistic, and invite us to infer with them that it therefore defies generalization. This has been supposed to present an obstacle to traditional moral theorizing, to have striking implications for moral epistemology and moral deliberation, and to rule out reductive theories of the normative, making it a bold and important thesis across the areas of normative theory, moral epistemology, moral psychology, and normative metaphysics. Though particularists emphasize the importance of the holism of the normative, however, it is not something that they have been able to explain. In this paper I’ll show how to use a small number of simple and, I’ll argue, independently compelling assumptions in order to both predict and explain the holistic features of the normative with respect to the non-normative. The basic idea of the paper is simple. It is that normative claims are holistic because they are general, rather than because they defy generalization.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Way (2015). Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
Jonathan Way (2015). Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
Yair Levy (2015). Normativity and Self-Relations. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):359-374.
Attila Tanyi (2013). Silencing Desires? Philosophia 41 (3):887-903.

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