David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):35-53 (2002)
Philosophers tend to assume that we have excellent knowledge of our own current conscious experience or 'phenomenology'. I argue that our knowledge of one aspect of our experience, the experience of visual imagery, is actually rather poor. Precedent for this position is found among the introspective psychologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two main arguments are advanced toward the conclusion that our knowledge of our own imagery is poor. First, the reader is asked to form a visual image, and it is expected that answering questions about certain basic features of that experience will be difficult. If so, it seems reasonable to suppose that people could be mistaken about those basic features of their own imagery. Second, it is observed that although people give widely variable reports about their own experiences of visual imagery, differences in report do not systematically correlate with differences on tests of skills that psychologists have often supposed to require visual imagery, such as mental rotation, visual creativity, and visual memory
|Keywords||Consciousness Experience Knowing Metaphysics Visual|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ben Bramble (2013). The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
Jennifer M. Windt (2010). The Immersive Spatiotemporal Hallucination Model of Dreaming. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):295-316.
Jakob Hohwy (2011). Phenomenal Variability and Introspective Reliability. Mind and Language 26 (3):261-286.
Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). No Unchallengeable Epistemic Authority, of Any Sort, Regarding Our Own Conscious Experience – Contra Dennett? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):107-113.
Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). Why Did We Think We Dreamed in Black and White? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (4):649-660.
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