Imagination and the motivational view of belief 55

1. The view that beliefs can be characterized solely by their motivational role promises an informative reduction of what it is for a state to be a belief state. It is therefore of import if such a view is wrong. In ‘On the aim of belief’ David Velleman (2000) presents an argument against such a motivational view of belief.1 On Velleman’s construal of the motivational view.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 21,527
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Neil Van Leeuwen (2009). The Motivational Role of Belief. Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.
Alfred R. Mele (1994). Self-Control and Belief. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):419 – 435.
Inga Nayding (2011). Conceptual Evidentialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

33 ( #125,849 of 1,911,917 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #256,649 of 1,911,917 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.