Online research in philosophy

The purpose of this paper is to clarify Prajñākaragupta’s view of mental perception ( mānasapratyakṣa ), with special emphasis on the relationship between mental perception and self-awareness. Dignāga, in his PS 1.6ab, says: “mental [perception] ( mānasa ) is [of two kinds:] a cognition of an [external] object and awareness of one’s own mental states such as passion.” According to his commentator Jinendrabuddhi, a cognition of an external object and awareness of an internal object such as passion are here equally called ‘mental perception’ in that neither depends on any of the five external sense organs. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, considers mental perception to be a cognition which arises after sensory perception, and does not call self-awareness ‘mental perception’. According to Prajñākaragupta, mental perception is the cognition which determines an object as ‘this’ ( idam iti jñānam ). Unlike Dharmakīrti, he holds that the mental perception follows not only after the sensory perception of an external object, but also after the awareness of an internal object. The self-awareness which Dignāga calls ‘mental perception’ is for Prajñākaragupta the cognition which determines as ‘this’ an internal object, or an object which consists in a cognition; it is to be differentiated from the cognition which cognizes cognition itself, that is, self-awareness in its original sense.

In this paper, I will discuss some aspects of a humanistic perspective on love which includes both idealistic as well as realistic elements of love. I will argue that any experience of love is directly affected by the level of self-awareness in an individual, that enables him to recognize the origins of his feelings and allows him to act upon them in an intentional manner. I use the term "awareness" in a similar way as, for example, the Jungian psychologist Arnold Mindell. He describes awareness as the capacity of a living human system which is connected to other minds to discover and to use the perception modality. There is a common element to all feelings which is directly related to the self-awareness of an individual. It is the truism that feelings or emotions accentuate a clear picture of an individual's traits of character. Emotionality without self-awareness is a rather burdensome experience for the transmitter as well as it is for the recipient of an emotion. With this I do not refer to rational control of emotionality. Rather, I refer to an existential human condition, in which the consequences of an individual's action must be realized and accepted by oneself.

Individual Differences in Subjective Experience First-Person Constraints on Theories of Consciousness, Subconsciousness, and Self-Consciousness Robert G. ...

When do children become aware of themselves as differentiated and unique entity in the world? When and how do they become self-aware? Based on some recent empirical evidence, 5 levels of self-awareness are presented and discussed as they chronologically unfold from the moment of birth to approximately 4-5 years of age. A natural history of children's developing self-awareness is proposed as well as a model of adult self-awareness that is informed by the dynamic of early development. Adult self-awareness is viewed as the dynamic flux between basic levels of consciousness that develop chronologically early in life.

We argue that the effects of evaluative learning may occur (a) without conscious perception of the affective stimuli, (b) without awareness of the stimulus contingencies, and (c) without any awareness that learning has occurred at all. Whether the three experiments reported in our target article provide conclusive evidence for either or any of these assertions is discussed in the commentaries of De Houwer and Field. We respond with the argument that when considered alongside other studies carried out over the past few decades, our experiments provide compelling evidence for a theory that posits a dissociation between evaluative learning and contingency awareness.