In defence of fictional realism

Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):138-149 (2009)
Fictional realism, i.e., the view that because fictions exist, fictional characters exist as well, has recently been accused of leading to inconsistency generated by phenomena of indeterminacy and inconsistency in fiction. We examine in detail four arguments against fictional realism, and present a version of fictional realism which can withstand those arguments.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.583.x
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Michael Jacovides (2010). Experiences as Complex Events. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.

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