David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (1):25-52 (2003)
an exemplar of an approach that takes the human mind to be largely the product of social and cultural factors with negligible contributions from biology. The author argues that on the contrary, his sociological theory of the categories is compatible with the possibility of innate cognitive capacities, taking causal cognition as his example. Whether and to what extent there are such innate capacities is a question for research in the cognitive neurosciences. The extent to which these innate capacities can then be explained by natural selection remains an open question for empirical investigation. Key Words: categories causality cognition Durkheim evolutionary psychology.
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Matthew Day (2009). Constructing Religion Without the Social: Durkheim, Latour, and Extended Cognition. Zygon 44 (3):719-737.
Jørn Bjerre (2012). Does Infant Cognition Research Undermine Sociological Theory? A Critique of Bergesen's Attack on Durkheim. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 42 (4):444-464.
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