Inexpressible properties and grelling's antinomy

Philosophical Studies 148 (3):369 - 385 (2010)
The paper discusses whether there are strictly inexpressible properties. Three main points are argued for: (i) Two different senses of ‘predicate t expresses property p ’ should be distinguished. (ii) The property of being a predicate that does not apply to itself is inexpressible in one of the senses of ‘express’, but not in the other. (iii) Since the said property is related to Grelling’s Antinomy, it is further argued that the antinomy does not imply the non-existence of that property.
Keywords Properties  Inexpressibility  Grelling’s paradox  Russell’s paradox
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DOI 10.2307/40606280
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References found in this work BETA
David Kaplan (1977/1989). Demonstratives. In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press 481-563.
Kit Fine (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
Graham Priest (2006). In Contradiction. Oxford University Press Uk.

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Citations of this work BETA
James R. Shaw (2013). Truth, Paradox, and Ineffable Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):64-104.

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