Is there a fundamental level?
Noûs 37 (3):498–517 (2003)
| Abstract | ‘‘Thus I believe that there is no part of matter which is not—I do not say divisible—but actually divided; and consequently the least particle ought to be considered as a world full of an infinity of different creatures.’’ (Leibniz, letter to Foucher). | |||||||||
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