“If you'd wiggled A, then B would've changed”

Synthese 179 (2):239-251 (2011)
Abstract
This paper deals with the truth conditions of conditional sentences. It focuses on a particular class of problematic examples for semantic theories for these sentences. I will argue that the examples show the need to refer to dynamic, in particular causal laws in an approach to their truth conditions. More particularly, I will claim that we need a causal notion of consequence. The proposal subsequently made uses a representation of causal dependencies as proposed in Pearl (2000) to formalize a causal notion of consequence. This notion inserted in premise semantics for counterfactuals in the style of Veltman (1976) and Kratzer (1979) will provide a new interpretation rule for conditionals. I will illustrate how this approach overcomes problems of previous proposals and end with some remarks on remaining questions
Keywords Counterfactual conditionals  Causal dependencies  Premise semantics  Fixed point semantics
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    References found in this work BETA
    David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Stefan Kaufmann (2013). Causal Premise Semantics. Cognitive Science 37 (6):1136-1170.
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