David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 55 (2):209 - 229 (1983)
Recent epistemology divides theories of knowledge according to their diagnoses of cases of failed knowledge, Gettier cases. Two rival camps have emerged: naturalism and justificationism. Naturalism attributes the failure of knowledge in these cases to the cognizer's failure to stand in a strong natural position vis-à-vis the proposition believed. Justificationism traces the failure to the cognizer's failure to be strongly justified in his belief. My aim is to reconcile these camps by offering a version of naturalism, a reliability theory of knowledge, that conforms to the central justificationist tenets. I argue that proposed reliability theories of knowledge, reliable indication theories, offer no prospect of a reconciliation because they misdiagnose failed knowledge in such a way as to violate a basic justificationist tenet. Proposed versions of justificationism, it turns out, fare no better with this tenet. I offer an alternative reliability theory of knowledge, a reliable process theory, that conforms to the justificationist tenet.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jane Duran (1988). Reliabilism, Foundationalism, and Naturalized Epistemic Justification Theory. Metaphilosophy 19 (2):113–127.
Frederick F. Schmitt (1987). Justification, Sociality, and Autonomy. Synthese 73 (1):43 - 85.
James Maffie (1993). Realism, Relativism, and Naturalized Meta-Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 24 (1-2):1-13.
Thieu Kuys (1989). Knowledge, Criticism, and Coherence. Philosophical Studies 57 (1):41 - 60.
Similar books and articles
Kelly Becker (2012). Basic Knowledge and Easy Understanding. Acta Analytica 27 (2):145-161.
Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Jarrett Leplin (2007). In Defense of Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):31 - 42.
Michael A. Bishop (2010). Why the Generality Problem is Everybody's Problem. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298.
William Harper (1998). Papier Mâché Problems in Epistemology: A Defense of Strong Internalism. Synthese 116 (1):27-49.
Robert Audi (2009). Reliability as a Virtue. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):43 - 54.
Jonathan Weisberg (2010). Bootstrapping in General. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525 - 548.
Stephen Hetherington (2007). Is This a World Where Knowledge has to Include Justification? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):41–69.
Marshall Swain (1985). Justification, Reasons, and Reliability. Synthese 64 (1):69 - 92.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #177,829 of 1,410,450 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #177,872 of 1,410,450 )
How can I increase my downloads?