Knowledge, justification, and reliability

Synthese 55 (2):209 - 229 (1983)
Abstract
Recent epistemology divides theories of knowledge according to their diagnoses of cases of failed knowledge, Gettier cases. Two rival camps have emerged: naturalism and justificationism. Naturalism attributes the failure of knowledge in these cases to the cognizer's failure to stand in a strong natural position vis-à-vis the proposition believed. Justificationism traces the failure to the cognizer's failure to be strongly justified in his belief. My aim is to reconcile these camps by offering a version of naturalism, a reliability theory of knowledge, that conforms to the central justificationist tenets. I argue that proposed reliability theories of knowledge, reliable indication theories, offer no prospect of a reconciliation because they misdiagnose failed knowledge in such a way as to violate a basic justificationist tenet. Proposed versions of justificationism, it turns out, fare no better with this tenet. I offer an alternative reliability theory of knowledge, a reliable process theory, that conforms to the justificationist tenet.
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Citations of this work BETA
Thieu Kuys (1989). Knowledge, Criticism, and Coherence. Philosophical Studies 57 (1):41 - 60.
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