Knowledge, relevant alternatives and missed clues

Analysis 61 (3):202–208 (2001)
Abstract
The classic version of the relevant alternatives theory (RAT) identifies knowledge with the elimination of relevant alternatives (Dretske 1981, Stine 1976, Lewis 1996, inter alia). I argue that the RAT is trapped by the problem of the missed clue, in which the subject sees but does not appreciate decisive information.
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Jonathan Schaffer (2004). Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):138–155.
Jonathan Schaffer (2004). Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):138 - 155.
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