Later Wittgenstein and the Problem of Easy Knowledge

Philosophical Investigations 34 (3):268-286 (2011)
Consider the following epistemological principle:KR: A knowledge source K can yield knowledge for subject S only if S knows K is reliable.Traditional epistemologists face a dilemma: either reject KR and confront what Stewart Cohen calls “the Problem of Easy Knowledge” or embrace KR and deny that unreflective beings can possess knowledge. In order to avoid this dilemma, an epistemological theory must allow for knowledge on the part of unreflective beings without falling prey to the problem of easy knowledge. I argue that the epistemology of the dying Wittgenstein, presented posthumously in On Certainty, avoids the dilemma
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2010.01421.x
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Stewart Cohen (2002). Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.

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