David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Neuroethics 5 (1):13-17 (2012)
“Mad belief” (in analogy with Lewisian “mad pain”) would be a belief state with none of the causal role characteristic of belief—a state not caused or apt to have been caused by any of the sorts of events that usually cause belief and involving no disposition toward the usual behavioral or other manifestations of belief. On token-functionalist views of belief, mad belief in this sense is conceptually impossible. Cases of delusion—or at least some cases of delusion—might be cases of belief gone half-mad, cases in which enough of the functional role characteristic of belief is absent that the subject is in an “in-between” state regarding the delusive content, such that it is neither quite right to say the subject determinately believes the delusive content nor quite right to say that she determinately fails to believe that content. Although Bortolotti (2010) briefly mentions such “sliding scale” approaches to the relationship of delusion and belief, she dismisses such approaches on rather thin grounds and then later makes some remarks that seem consonant with sliding scale approaches
|Keywords||Belief Bortolotti, Lisa Delusion Dispositions Functionalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2005). In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.
Donald Davidson (1985). Incoherence and Irrationality. Dialectica 39 (4):345-54.
Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1960). The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Paterson, N.J.,Littlefield, Adams.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief. Noûs 36 (2):249-75.
Andrew Huddleston (2012). Naughty Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):209-222.
John Cottingham (2009). Why Believe? Continuum.
Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief. Noûs 36 (2):249-275.
R. Bogdan (ed.) (1986). Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press.
Curtis Brown (1992). Direct and Indirect Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):289-316.
Michael Bergmann (2006). Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):198-207.
Eric Schwitzgebel (2010). Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.
Scott F. Aikin (2006). Contrastive Self-Attribution of Belief. Social Epistemology 20 (1):93 – 103.
Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2007). The Nature of Belief. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):61-82.
Brian Garvey (1999). Adolf Grünbaum on Religious Delusions. Religious Studies 35 (1):19-35.
David Hunter (2011). Alienated Belief. Dialectica 65 (2):221-240.
E. J. Coffman (2010). Misleading Dispositions and the Value of Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research 35:241-258.
Derek A. McDougall (1972). Religious Belief and Philosophical Analysis. Mind 81 (324):519-532.
Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo (2001). Infinitary Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.
Added to index2011-06-20
Total downloads36 ( #47,582 of 1,100,827 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #115,533 of 1,100,827 )
How can I increase my downloads?