David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):74–85 (2008)
According to memory foundationalism, seeming to remember that P is prima facie justification for believing that P. There is a common objection to this theory: If I previously believed that P carelessly (i.e. without justification) and later seem to remember that P, then (according to memory foundationalism) I have somehow acquired justification for a previously unjustified belief. In this paper, I explore this objection. I begin by distinguishing between two versions of it: One where I seem to remember that P while also seeming to remember being careless in my original believing that P and the other where I seem to remember that P while not seeming to remember my past carelessness. I argue that the former case is the real challenge for memory foundationalism. After establishing the case of unforgotten carelessness as objection to memory foundationalism, I recast memory foundationalism in way that allows it to escape this objection.
|Keywords||memory foundationalism internalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Cowan (2013). Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):n/a-n/a.
Similar books and articles
Daniel Howard-Snyder (2004). Lehrer's Case Against Foundationalism. Erkenntnis 60 (1):51-73.
Stephen David Ross (2010). Re-Membering. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series:43-59.
James A. Keller (1986). Foundationalism, Circular Justification, and the Levels Gambit. Synthese 68 (2):205 - 212.
J. Campbell (1997). The Structure of Time in Autobiographical Memory. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):105-17.
Michael Bergmann (2004). What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.
Peter Tramel (2008). Haack's Foundherentism is a Foundationalism. Synthese 160 (2):215 - 228.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). What is Wrong with Minimal Foundationalism? Erkenntnis 21 (2):175-184.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). The Confusion Over Foundationalism. Philosophia 16 (3-4):345-354.
Thomas D. Senor (1993). Internalistic Foundationalism and the Justification of Memory Belief. Synthese 94 (3):453 - 476.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads324 ( #1,362 of 1,683,859 )
Recent downloads (6 months)26 ( #7,946 of 1,683,859 )
How can I increase my downloads?