Methodological Naturalism vs. Methodological Realism

Philo 3 (2):30-37 (2000)
Abstract
According to Eugenie Scott, methodological materialism---the view that science attempts to explain the world using material processes---does not imply philosophical materialism---the view that all that exists are material processes. Thus one can consistently be both a scientist and a theist. According to Phillip Johnson, however, methodological materialism presupposes philosophical materialism. Consequently, scientists are unable to see the cogency of supernatural explanations, like creationism. I argue that both Scott and Johnson are wrong: scientists are not limited to explaining tbe world using material processes and science does not presuppose materialism. Thus scientists’ rejection of creationism is not irrational
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Gregory W. Dawes (2011). In Defense of Naturalism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):3-25.
    Scott Tanona (2010). The Pursuit of the Natural. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):79 - 87.
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