Mill on quality and quantity

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):102-104 (2003)
A well known paragraph in Mill’s ‘Utilitarianism’ has standardly been misread. Mill does not claim that if some pleasure is of ‘higher quality’, then it will be (or ought to be) chosen over the pleasure of lower quality regardless of their respective quantities. Instead he says that if some pleasure will be chosen over another available in larger quantity, then we are justified in saying that the pleasure so chosen is of higher quality than the other. This assertion is unproblematic.
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References found in this work BETA
David O. Brink (1992). Mill's Deliberative Utilitarianism. Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1):67-103.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Huemer (2010). Lexical Priority and the Problem of Risk. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):332-351.
Jonathan Riley (2003). Interpreting Mill's Qualitative Hedonism. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):410–418.
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