David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):41-62 (2009)
In sec. 1.1 I emphasize the meliorative purpose of epistemology, and I characterize Goldman's epistemology as reliabilistic, cognitive, social, and meliorative. In sec. 1.2 I point out that Goldman's weak notion of knowledge is in conflict with our ordinary usage of 'knowledge'. In sec. 2 I argue for an externalist-internalist hybrid conception of justification which adds reliability-indicators to externalist knowledge. Reliability-indicators produce a veritistic surplus value for the social spread of knowledge. In sec. 3 I analyze some particular meliorative rules which have been proposed by Goldman. I prove that obedience to the rule of maximally specific evidence increases expected veritistic value (sec. 3.1), and I argue that rule-circular arguments are epistemically worthless (sec. 3.2). In the final sec. 3.3 I report a non-circular justification of meta-induction which has been developed elsewhere.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Gerhard Schurz (2011). Truth-Conduciveness as the Primary Epistemic Justification of Normative Systems of Reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):266-267.
Similar books and articles
Keith Butler (1997). Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.
Gerhard Schurz (2008). Third-Person Internalism: A Critical Examination of Externalism and a Foundation-Oriented Alternative. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 23 (1):9-28.
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup (2004). An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.
Elke Brendel (2009). Truth and Weak Knowledge in Goldman's Veritistic Social Epistemology. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):3-17.
Sven Bernecker (2006). Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.
Murray Clarke (2000). Reliabilism and the Meliorative Project. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:75-82.
William Harper (1998). Papier Mâché Problems in Epistemology: A Defense of Strong Internalism. Synthese 116 (1):27-49.
Tomoji Shogenji (2012). Internalism and Externalism in Meliorative Epistemology. Erkenntnis 76 (1):59-72.
Added to index2010-01-16
Total downloads7 ( #218,804 of 1,692,915 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #114,250 of 1,692,915 )
How can I increase my downloads?